erage over ω time E ω T A(x,ω) = |x| O(1) . An inverter I ∈ P for f attempts to compute from f (x) a list of strings containing x. Its success rate s I,f (n) is the probability of {x ∈ {0, 1} n , ω : x ∈ I(f (x), ω)}. A guesser for b : S → {±1} on f ∈P is a P -algorithm G(y, ω) ∈ {0, ±1}. Its success rate is
2 /E x,ω G(x, ω) 2 , i.e. the inverse sample size needed to notice the correlation with b. The security of OWF f or of its hidden bit b is a lower bound of 1/s(n) for all I (or G) and big enough n.
Let us pad a OWF f to f ′ (x, r) = (y, r), y = f (x); x, y, r ∈ Z n 2 . Let b(x, r) = (−1) (x·r) ; v i = 0 i−1 10 n−i . We fix y, ω, denote G r = G(y, r, ω) and c(x) = E r b(x, r)G r / E r G 2 r . We will build an inverter for f (x) with the success probability ≥ c(x) 2 . Due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, its overall success rate ≥ s G,b,f . Note that c(x) (if extended to real vectors) is a generic, up to a constant factor, multilinear function with coefficients given by G r . It is the Walsh (Fourier over group Z n 2 ) transformation of G r . Say c(x) > 0. Then averaging (−1) (x·r) G r over > 2n/c(x) 2 random pairwise independent r yields > 0 with probability > 1 − 1/2n, and the same for (−1)
2 ). Take a random matrix R ∈ {0, 1} n×k . Then the vectors Rp, p ∈ {0, 1} k \ {0 k } are pairwise independent. So, for a fraction ≥ 1 − 1/2n of R, sign p (−1) xRp G Rp+vi = (−1) xi . We could thus find x i for all i with probability 1/2 if we knew z = xR. But z is short: we can try all 2 k possible values! So, the inverter flips l(ω) ≤ 2n coins until the first 0 and sets k = l + ⌈log 5n⌉. With 2c(x) 2 chance k is large enough. Then for a random R and all i, p it computes g i (p) = G Rp+vi . It uses Fast Fourier on g i to compute h i (z) = p (−1) (z·p) g i (p). The sign of h i (z) is the i-th bit for the z-th member of output list.
Using an n × i Toeplitz matrix in place of the vector r one can extract i bits from x rather than one. According to [GL] , this will decrease the security of the bits by a factor of 2 i . The power of the above theorem (and a weaker one in [GL] ) can be seen even in the trivial case f (x) = 0. It is an OWF if x has any distribution such that the probability of x is always, say, < 4 −i . No relation between |x| and i or other condition is needed. Such "junk" x are much more available than random uniformly distributed strings. Having a fixed random r and an unlimited supply of such x, one can keep extracting i "nearly perfect," with security 2 i , random bits from each x. In this case the security (of f and thus of b) is probabilistic: it holds for functions i.e. algorithms with any oracle. This method requires no additional proof and puts much weaker assumptions on the distribution than the original Vazirani result.
The hidden bit works for any OWF. But only "almost bijections" are known to yield pseudorandom generators without crucial security loss. Suppose, however, we have a length preserving f ∈P with a polynomial fraction of y for which x ∈ f −1 (y) is hard to find. We may try to convert it into an "almost bijection" with the same property. It may be that f ′ (a, x) = (a, f (x) + ax) (where a is in a finite field and slightly longer than x) will always do.
